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Abstract—The innovative application of 5G core technologies,
namely Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Func-
tion Virtualization (NFV), can help reduce capital and opera-
tional expenditures in industrial networks. Nevertheless, SDN
expands the attack surface of the communication infrastructure,
thus necessitating the introduction of additional security mecha-
nisms. A wind park is a good example of an industrial application
relying on a network with strict performance, security, and
reliability requirements, and was chosen as a representative
example of industrial systems. This work highlights the benefit
of leveraging the flexibility of SDN/NFV-enabled networks to
deploy enhanced, reactive security mechanisms for the protection
of the industrial network, via the use of Service Function
Chaining. Moreover, a proof of concept implementation of the
reactive security framework for an industrial-grade wind park
network is presented. The framework is equipped with SDN
and SCADA honeypots, modelled on (and deployable to) an
actual, operating wind park, allowing continuous monitoring of
the industrial network and detailed analysis of potential attacks,
thus isolating attackers and enabling the assessment of their level
of sophistication.
Index Terms—Software Defined Networks; SDN; Network
Function Virtualization; NFV; Service Function Chaining; Re-
active Security; Industrial networking; Wind Parks;
I. INTRODUCTION
With anticipated exponential growth of connected devices,
future networks require an open-solutions architecture, facili-
tated by standards and a strong ecosystem. Such devices need
a simple interface to the connected network to request the
kind of communication service characterized by guarantees
about bandwidth, delay, jitter, packet loss or redundancy. In
response, the network should grant the requested network re-
sources automatically and program the intermediate network-
ing devices based on device profile and privileges. A similar
requirement also comes from business applications where ap-
plication itself asks for particular network resources based on
its needs. Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network
Function Virtualization (NFV), important parts of 5G network-
ing provide promising combination leading to programmable
connectivity, rapid service provisioning and service chaining
and can thus help lower capital and operational expenditure
costs (CAPEX/OPEX) in the control network infrastructure.
Nevertheless, SDN and NFV expand the attack surface of the
communication infrastructure, necessitating the introduction of
additional security mechanisms. Industrial networks typically
come with strict performance, security, and reliability require-
ments. Furthermore, by appropriately leveraging the flexibility
of SDN/NFV-enabled networks in the context of the adopted
security mechanisms, industrial infrastructures can not only
match but also improve their security posture compared to the
existing, traditional networking environments [1].
This paper showcases a representative use case of an indus-
trial network by considering an industrial control network for
wind park operations. The wind park control network has been
chosen as a key industrial application as wind energy has now
established itself as a mainstay of sustainable energy genera-
tion. Nevertheless, the flexibility of SDN networks means they
can also help provide better security for industrial networks.
Due to the controller’s global view of the network and the
ability to reprogram the data plane at real time, we can not
only revisit old security concepts (e.g. Firewalls) but introduce
new techniques as well (e.g. steering suspicious traffic to
SDN/SCADA Honeypots, adopting moving target defense and
other reactive techniques). The deployment of these enhanced
security concepts is in line with the enhanced protection
requirements of critical infrastructures, given that the old
paradigm of perimeter defenses and trusted internal networks
is obsolete, as recent attacks have demonstrated [2]. Thus,
enhanced security services are more than ”good practice”,
but a requirement, as evidenced, for example, by the recent
update to North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection standards, such as
the measures detailed in the latest versions of CIP-007 (i.e.
CIP-007-6 [3]), which dictate continuous network monitoring
and deployment of network defenses to detect/block malicious
activity within the Utilities’ perimeter.
Motivated by the above, we present a Reactive Security
Framework for next generation 5G (and SDN/NFV in specific)
enabled industrial networks. More specifically, considering
the energy production critical infrastructures, the framework
features enhanced security functions, such as SCADA hon-
eypots, are modelled based upon an operational wind park
and ready to be deployed in one. The presented framework
allows the continuous monitoring of the wind park industrial
network, with provisions to reduce the impact of the secu-
rity functions on the network’s performance and to alleviate
the burden of deploying and managing the security services
themselves. Moreover, the framework’s Honeynet (consisting
of both active a SCADA-specific honeypot and a passive
honeypot) facilitates the detailed analysis of potential attacks,
isolating attackers and enabling the assessment of their level
of sophistication (e.g. from script kiddies to state actors).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, an overview of related work is presented. In Section
III, the Service Function Chaining approach (background and
motivation) is analysed. In Section IV, we preview the reactive
security framework. Finally, Section V provides a discussion,
conclusions and future steps of our work.
II. RELATED WORK
Several SFC-related research efforts can be identified in
the literature. Blendin et al. [4], exploit Linux namespaces
to create isolated service instances per service chain, allowing
one-to-one mapping of users to service instances. Network
Service Headers (NSH) [5] is another approach that involves
the introduction of SFC-specific 4-byte headers that include
all the information needed (including associated metadata) to
reach a policy decision with regard to what service chain the
traffic should follow. As part of the relevant IETF efforts,
the NSH approach has been extended to define a new service
plane protocol (a dedicated service plane) for the creation of
dynamic service chains [6]. StEERING [7] is an OpenFlow-
based alternative that allows for per-subscriber and per-traffic
type/application traffic routing to the various service functions,
via simple policies propagated from a centralized control
point. Researchers have also introduced SIMPLE [8], a policy
enforcement layer that focuses on middleware-specific traffic
steering and considers the inclusion of legacy service instances
into the chain. It is based on monitoring and correlating packet
headers before and after they traverse a specific service func-
tion, though this leads to a rather complex process (collecting
packets for correlation, matching packets with high accuracy
etc.). The chaining of Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) is
another aspect examined in the literature, which considers the
trend of virtualizing networks and network functions in mod-
ern networks. From this perspective, Megraghdam et al. [9]
present a formal model for specifying VNF chains and propose
a context-free language for denoting VNF compositions.
III. SERVICE FUNCTION CHAINING
A. Background and Motivation
In typical network deployments, the end-to-end traffic of
various applications typically must go through several net-
work services (e.g. firewalls, load-balancers, WAN acceler-
ators). It can also be referred to as Service Functions (or
L4-L7 Services, or Network Functions, depending on the
source/organisation) that are placed along its path. This tradi-
tional networking concept and the associated service deploy-
ments have a number of constraints and inefficiencies [10],
such as: topology constraints (network services are highly
dependent on a specific network topology, which is hard to
update); complex configuration and scaling-out (a consequence
of topological dependencies, especially when trying to ensure
consistent ordering of service functions and/or when sym-
metric traffic flows are needed; this complexity also hinders
scaling out the infrastructure); constrained high availability (as
alternative and/or redundant service functions must typically
be placed on the same network location as the primary one);
inconsistent or inelastic service chains (network administrators
have no consistent way to impose and verify the ordering of
individual service functions, other than using strict topologies
- on the other hand, these topology constraints necessitate that
traffic goes through a rigid set of services functions, often im-
posing unnecessary capacity and latency costs, while changes
to this service chain can introduce a significant administrative
burden); coarse policy enforcement (classification capabilities
and the associated policy enforcements mechanisms are of
coarse nature, e.g. using topology information); coarse traffic
selection criteria (as all traffic in a particular network segment
typically has to traverse all the service functions along its
path). The above are exacerbated nowadays, with the ubiq-
uitous use of virtual platforms, which necessitates the use of
dynamic and flexible service environments. This is even more
pronounced in service provider and/or cloud environments,
with infrastructures spanning different domains and serving
numerous tenants, each with their own requirements. Said ten-
ants may share a subset of the providers’ service functions, and
may require dynamic changes to traffic and service function
routing, to follow updates to their policies (e.g. security) or
Service Level Agreements.
Service Function Chaining (SFC) aims to address these
issues via a service-specific overlay that creates a service-
oriented topology, on top of the existing network topology,
thus providing service function interoperability [11]. An SDN-
based SFC Architecture, such as the one defined by the Open
Networking Foundation [12], can extend this concept, exploit-
ing the flexibility and advanced capabilities of software defined
networks, to provide novel and comprehensive solutions for
the above-stated presented weaknesses of the legacy networks.
B. Security Service Chaining
Security services are a prime example of traditional network
service functions that can benefit from the adoption of SFC,
especially in the context of SDN networks. Indeed, security
functions such as Access Control Lists (ACLs), Segment, Edge
and Application Firewalls, Intrusion Detection and/or Intrusion
Prevention systems (IDS/IPS) and Deep Packet Inspection
(DPI) are some of the principal service functions considered
by IETF when presenting SFC use cases pertaining to Data
Centers [13] and Mobile Networks [14]. Said IETF studies
consider several SFC use cases and highlight the numerous
drawbacks of using traditional service provision methods when
applying, among others, the security functions.
The security services themselves are typically been de-
ployed as monolithic platforms (often hardware-based), in-
stalled at fixed locations inside and/or at the edge of trust
domains, and being rigid and static, often lacking automatic
reconfiguration and customization capabilities. This approach,
combined with the typical networks’ architectural restrictions
mentioned above, increase operational complexity, prohibit
dynamic updates and impose significant (and often unneces-
sary) performance overheads, as each network packet must be
processed by a series of predefined service functions, even
when these are redundant [15].
A typical example of an important, and also ubiquitous,
security-related function is Deep Packet Inspection (DPI),
whereby packet payloads are matched against a set of pre-
defined patterns. DPI imposes a significant performance over-
head, because of the pattern matching mechanisms that are at
the core its operation, and thus largely unavoidable (motivating
a wealth of research efforts focusing on improving their perfor-
mance [16], [17]). Nevertheless, DPI, in one form or another,
is part of many network (hardware or software) appliances
and middleboxes; some examples can be seen in Table I. As
Bremler-Barr et al. [18] have demonstrated, extracting the DPI
functionality and providing it as a common service function
to various applications (combining and matching DPI patterns
from different sources) can result in significant performance
gains; their benchmarks, involving a single Snort-based IDS
service function, run in Mininet over OpenFlow to emulate
an SDN deployment, compared to two separate traditional
TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF NETWORK APPLIANCES EMPLOYING DPI [18]
Appliance Examples
Intrusion Detection System Snort 3, Bro4
Antivirus/Anti-SPAM ClamAV5
L7 Firewall Linux L7-filter6, ModSecurity7
L7 Load Balancer F58 and A109
Leakage/Data Loss - Prevention System Checkpoint DLP10
Network Analyzer/Classifier Qosmos11
Traffic Shaper/WAN optimization Blue Coat PacketShapper12
instances of Snort, showed that the former (i.e. the single DPI
service function) performed 67%-86% faster than the latter.
Leveraging the benefits of SDN-based SFC deployments
involves reversing this trend for monolithic, ”all-in-one”,
security services, which are now commonplace. This is an
approach, brought forward in part because of the advance-
ments in hardware performance, which meant that a single,
relatively affordable, hardware platform had enough resources
to accomplish multiple tasks simultaneously.
Instead, in the context of SFC, the focus is on breaking-
up these complex services into dedicated service functions,
each providing a single task. This shift is not dissimilar to
the emergence of the Microservices1 as described in [19],
software architectural style (i.e. the Microservices Software
Architecture, MSA), which moves developers away from the
once-dominant paradigm of building entire applications as a
monolith (again, leveraging the benefits of more capable hard-
ware and mature, sophisticated programming tools), towards
applications made up from a number smaller services (elastic,
resilient, composable, minimal and complete2), each of them
performing a single function (adopting the ”Do one thing and
do it well” philosophy).
C. Security Service Functions
A list of key security mechanisms to be leveraged in a secure
industrial infrastructure, and deployed as virtualized network
service functions, appears below:
• Generic IDS/IPS is a service able to monitor traffic
or system activities for suspicious activities or attack
violations, also able to prevent malicious attacks if needed
(in the case of IPS).
• SCADA IDS/IPS is a service able to monitor traffic
or system activities for suspicious activities or attack
violations, also able to prevent malicious attacks if needed
(in the case of IPS).
1http://martinfowler.com/articles/microservices.html
2http://www.nirmata.com/2015/02/microservices-five-architectural-
constraints/
3http://www.snort.org
4http://bro-ids.org
5http://www.clamav.net/
6https://sourceforge.net/projects/l7-filter/
7https://www.modsecurity.org/
8https://f5.com/products/modules/local-traffic-manager
9http://www.a10networks.com/products/axseries-
aflex advanced scripting.php
10http://www.checkpoint.com/products/dlp-software-blade/
11http://www.qosmos.com/products/technology-overview/
12https://www.bluecoat.com/products-and-solutions/wan-optimization-
packetshaper
• Honeynet - A set of functions (Honeypots), emulating a
production network deployment, able to attract and detect
attacks, acting as a decoy or dummy target.
• Firewall is a service or appliance running within a vir-
tualised environment providing packet filtering. Legacy
firewalls (e.g. actual hardware appliances) are also sup-
ported and can easily be integrated into the architecture.
• DPI is a function for advanced packet filtering (data and
header) running at the application layer of OSI reference
model. In DPI packet payloads are matched against a set
of predefined patterns.
• Network Virtualisation - The use of Virtual eXtensible
Local Area Network (VXLAN13), a VLAN-like encap-
sulation technique to encapsulate MAC-based OSI layer
2 Ethernet frames within layer 4 UDP packets, brings
the scalability and isolation benefits needed in virtualised
computing environments.
• Access Control Lists, used at the entry of the wind
park domain to route traffic to the appropriate isolated
virtual networks and the corresponding security service
functions.
Other than the ones employed above, other Service Func-
tions could be included in a real deployment, such as HTTP
header enrichment functions, TCP optimisers, packet inspec-
tors (IPFiX, DDoS), IPSec, Resource Signalling, etc.
IV. THE REACTIVE SECURITY FRAMEWORK -
IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH
Considering the above, this work focuses on providing a
security framework to protect critical industrial infrastructures,
considering the wind park as a characteristic example, also
studying the more complex multi-tenant use case (i.e. a service
provider serving multiple tenants; and its evolution, whereby
multiple virtual tenant networks have to be established) and
the chaining of vital security functions. This work follows
closely the standardization efforts of IETF, and the SFC
Working Group14 in specific, building on top of the work of
the Open Networking Foundation and the associated Open-
Daylight Controller modules, adopting and extending their
features. Moreover, special care is given to the security of the
SFC mechanisms, e.g. by guaranteeing the integrity of SFC-
related data added to the packets for identifying the service
functions chains, and by ensuring that no sensitive SFC data
(and the associated metadata), crosses different SFC domains,
or legacy networks, unprotected.
One of the goals of this effort is to provide a secure
industrial networking infrastructure, via the associated security
mechanisms, such as network monitoring and intrusion detec-
tion for industrial SDN networks. To achieve this objective, the
security framework presented herein includes network moni-
toring and intrusion detection for identification of attacks and
run-time network adaptation for attack response and mitigation
mechanisms. By leveraging security network functions such as
Firewalls, IDS, DPI, Honeypots and Honeynets, the framework
can create a number of service function chains, to forward
traffic based on the type of traffic or running application. The
aim of this Service Chaining is to overcome constraints and
inefficiencies, as mentioned previously. This can be used to
fulfil the target of providing security profiles per application
13https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7348
14https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sfc/charter/
Fig. 1. Reactive Security Framework The Service Chains
classification based on the originating application, or per tenant
classification serving multiple virtual tenant networks with the
chaining of vital security functions or, alternatively, per traffic
classification, for both intra- and inter- domain deployments,
following predefined Service Function Paths for each traffic
type.
A. Service Functions in the Framework
The reactive security framework includes a number of
different service functions as detailed in the subsections below.
1) IDS and SCADA IDS: The framework’s security mech-
anisms include continuous network monitoring and intrusion
detection for identification of attacks and run-time network
adaptation for attack response and mitigation mechanisms.
More specifically, IDS instances of Snort15 are deployed, with
scripts to ensure that the most up-to-date rules are constantly
active. A database for event monitoring is present, while
provisions are made to allow for future extensions to transmit
relevant information to a security backend (e.g. for more
sophisticated pattern matching). Moreover, a SCADA-specific
instance of Snort16 is also deployed, where SCADA traffic will
be routed. This limits the delay imposed on the SCADA traffic
by the IDS functionality (a delay that significantly depends on
the number of rules/patterns in the IDS’s database, which will
be significantly lower in the case of the IDS which only has
SCADA-specific rules installed).
2) Honeynet: Network-based honeypots have been widely
used to detect attacks and malware. A honeypot is a decoy
deployment that can fool attackers into thinking they are
hitting a real network whereas in the same time it is used
to collect information about the attacker and attack method. A
Honeynet is a set of functions, emulating a production network
deployment, able to attract and detect attacks, acting as a
decoy or dummy target. In the protected wind park network,
a Honeynet is deployed, consisting of Honeypots emulating
SDN and other network elements, as well as Honeypots
emulating the operational systems of the wind park, and
more specifically elements such as the SCADA systems and
the data historian. Simple Honeypots17 and SCADA-specific
15http://www.snort.org
16http://blog.snort.org/2012/01/snort-292-scada-preprocessors.html
17Honeyd (simple honeypot), https://github.com/sk4ld/gridpot
Honeypots18 are deployed to emulate the exact network and
SCADA system setup present in the SDN-enabled wind park.
Moreover, passive Honeypots (Early Warning Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems, EWIS, in specific [20]) are also be part of the
Honeynet, acting as a network telescope on the production part
of the industrial network, to monitor all activity in normally
unused parts of the network. Such activity is a good indicator
of malicious entities operating on the network (such as an
attacker probing/foot-printing the network), thus providing
early warning of incoming attacks.
3) Firewall: A software or hardware firewall instance is
also deployed on the wind park’s network to implement net-
work perimeter security. This is a software firewall (instance of
pfsense19), but a hardware (legacy) firewall appliance already
present in the industrial network could also be used, or even
a virtualized commercial firewall appliance (such as the VM-
Series from Palo Alto20). The type of firewall, as well as its
placement, is irrelevant in the context of the reactive security
framework employed to protect the industrial network, as the
service plane view of the framework focuses on the type of
service and not the underlying technology that is used to offer
this service, allowing for the use of any type of firewall, and
for its placement in any place on an SDN network deployment.
4) DPI: In DPI packet payloads are matched against a
set of predefined patterns. DPI imposes a significant perfor-
mance overhead, but nevertheless, in one form or another, is
part of many network (hardware or software) appliances and
middleboxes. As Bremler-Barr et al. [18] have demonstrated,
extracting the DPI functionality and providing it as a com-
mon service function to various applications (combining and
matching DPI patterns from different sources) can result in
significant performance gains. In the proposed framework’s
proof-of-concept, nDPI21 is employed to implement the DPI
function, monitor incoming traffic, and assign it to the (sub-
)set of security service functions intended for the correspond-
ing traffic type.
18Adapting Honeyd for SCADA emulation, https://sourceforge.net/projects/
scadahoneynet/, http://scadahoneynet.sourceforge.netcite/
19https://pfsense.org/
20https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/products/secure-the-network
/virtualized-next-generation-firewall/vm-series
21http://www.ntop.org/products/deep-packet-inspection/ndpi/
B. Traffic Classification and Function Chaining
The per-traffic type classification deployment example
of the Reactive Security framework is detailed below. In
this instance, a security SFC-based enhancement, for both
intra- and inter- domain deployments, features the ability
to forward traffic based on its security classification (e.g.
unknown/malicious/legitimate), following predefined Service
Function Paths for each traffic type. This type of classification
opens up various possibilities for the integration of advanced
malicious traffic detection techniques (e.g. exploiting machine
learning). As an example, let us assume that a data packet
enters the intra-domain win park deployment. Based on its
classification by the DPI, the traffic will be directed to one
of three different paths as depicted in the following figure.
A core part of this use case is the classifier. The classifier is
responsible for classifying and forwarding packets based on
predefined rules, exploiting pattern matching and tags found
on the packet headers, and forwards the packets through
one of the predefined function chains. The classification of
unknown traffic is based on the nDPI library detailed above.
The DPI entity disassembles the traffic packets, assesses their
content and decides on their traffic type. Then, the packet is
repackaged, assigning the appropriate headers to allow for its
routing through the corresponding service chain.
In more detail, based on the classification of each packet,
the traffic can be classified as unknown (original state when
entering the SFC plane), SCADA (legitimate SCADA traffic),
other (any other, non-SCADA, legitimate traffic) or Malicious.
Thus, four different chains are defined as follows (Figure 1):
• SFC1 - Unknown: Firewall - DPI
• SFC2 - SCADA: Firewall - SCADA lDS
• SFC3 - Other: Firewall- IDS
• SFC4 - Malicious: Firewall- Honeypot/Honeynet
When there is no previous acquired knowledge about the
packet’s classification (i.e. no tag on the packet header), the
classifier will assign the packet to the Unknown chain (SFC1),
aiming to detect any malicious activity, assess its impact, and
attach the associated tag, to help form the system’s response
and enhance the attack mitigation effectiveness. However,
even if this chain will protect SDN network from malicious
attacks, the procedure will add delay to the transmission.
Thus, in the case of packets already carrying a tag classifying
it as legitimate, it will only be forwarded to the firewall
(via the associated chain, SFC2 or SFC3), providing faster
packet transmission. Finally, in case of a malicious type of
packets, the classifier will forward the packets to the honeypot
(or honeynet, depending on the deployment), via SFC4, to
investigate the type of attack and the purpose of the attacker.
C. SDN Controller Modules
To implement the above functionality, other than the security
service functions themselves (e.g. IDS, Honeypots) that need
to be installed and setup appropriately, certain purpose-built
modules as well as enhancements to existing SDN controller
modules are needed; in this case for the OpenDaylight (ODL)
controller.
1) SFC Manager: In more detail, the SFC Manager con-
troller module exposes a number of interfaces that various
components can use to provide and receive information about
service chains that need to be built, which tenants want to use
them, which destinations are being accessed, what applications
Fig. 2. Graphical User Interface for real-time monitoring of the operation of
the Reactive Security Framework on the ODL Controller
the traffic pertains to and about the service instances of the
network functions. The SFC Manager aggregates this infor-
mation, combines it, and sends service chains in commands
to the SDN Controller (we use OpenDaylight22 and SFC-
ODL23). The SDN controller, in turn, programs the underlying
forwarding elements that do the actual packet forwarding. In
essence the SDN Controller is converting commands from
the high-level SFC language to the low-level flow filters of
expressed in the OpenFlow semantics.
2) Graphical User Interface: To assess and manage the
proof of concept implementation of the Reactive Security
Framework, a Graphical User Interface (GUI) was developed,
as an additional module on the ODL SDN Controller. The
GUI displays instantiated VMs/Service Chains and traffic
paths, based on the chains seen in Figure 1. Based on this
classification, SCADA traffic goes to the SCADA IDS and
then to its intended SCADA system at the wind park. HTTP
traffic goes to normal IDS and then to its intended system
at the wind park. Malicious traffic (e.g. nmap port scan)
is detected and goes to Honeypot/Honeynet instead of its
intended target wind park system. Finally, unknown traffic is
routed to DPI for classification. Based on the DPI classification
results, a modification in the header of the packer, can forward
the traffic to the respective active chain (legitimate, SCADA
or malicious). Changes in path for different traffic types are
depicted on the GUI. Moreover, the resources (i.e. CPU and
memory load) of the various security service functions, is
presented in real-time on a separate table. The above are
depicted in Figure 2.
V. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This work presented a reactive security framework mod-
elled on (and deployable to) an actual, operating Wind park,
allowing continuous monitoring of the industrial network and
detailed analysis of potential attacks, thus isolating attackers
and enabling the assessment of their level of sophistication
(e.g. from script kiddies to state actors).
In contrast to the proactive deployment of specific security
mechanisms (such as the ones detailed in the Section IV),
22https://www.opendaylight.org
23https://wiki.opendaylight.org/view/Service Function Chaining:Main
that are setup and deployed before an attack takes place (typi-
cally at the network’s design phase), the reactive mechanisms
employed here are able to react in real time to changes in
the network as well as the traffic traversing said network,
e.g. to automatically mitigate attacks, block malicious entities,
route them to specific, dummy network components to allow
for enhanced monitoring of their actions or even trigger the
deployment of new security functions to help alleviate the
effects of an ongoing attack. By leveraging the flexibility of
SDN-based deployments and the concept of SFC, a service-
specific overlay creates a service-oriented topology, on top of
the existing network topology, thus providing service function
interoperability. Service Function Chaining provides the ability
to define an ordered list of network services. The frame-
work’s Service Functions (SFs) include the security functions
proactively deployed (as detailed in the previous subsection);
whether the underlying network and the service functions
are virtualised or not, is irrelevant from the perspective of
the SFC. These service are then ”stitched” together in the
network to create a service chain, allowing us to route un-
known/suspicious traffic via the Intrusion Detection and Deep
Packet Inspection Service Functions, to classify it (as either
legitimate or malicious), allowing us to forward it to the
wind park or the honeypot, accordingly. With this mechanism,
malicious traffic can be isolated in the honeypot, allowing
us to track the attacker, identify her purpose and keep her
occupied. The honeypot itself is modelled after the actual
operating wind park, fully emulating both the network (SDN-
based) elements as well as the industrial application-related
devices (e.g. SCADA systems), by combining the appropriate
honeypot/honeynet security tools, as detailed above. Using
this scheme, the Honeynet’s effectiveness is enhanced, taking
advantage of the SDN capabilities of dynamic network recon-
figurations and traffic forwarding, and this is something that is
exploited in the context of VirtuWind’s reactive security frame-
work, to reroute malicious traffic to Honeypots/Honeynets
instances. Moreover, the deployment of this reactive security
framework not only enhances the industrial network’s security,
but also decreases the performance impact of the security
functions. The DPI’s performance impact is minimised as the
traffic only has to go through one DPI instance, and the same
can be said for the IDS/IPS functionality, as e.g. the SCADA
traffic only has to go through a faster-performing, SCADA-
specific IDS instance.
As future work, we intend to enhance the framework via the
use of an open source NFV Management and Orchestration
(MANO) software stack, which, via the definition of the
service templates at the MANO, will be responsible for the
boot-up of the necessary VMs using a Virtual Infrastructure
Management (VIM) software (e.g. OpenStack). In turn, the
MANO will be used to program the ODL Controller accord-
ingly, passing the necessary information to the SFC Manager.
This will also enable a more accurate monitoring of the
Service Functions’ resources, also allowing the instantiation
of additional VMs when, e.g., one of the existing functions
is overloaded. Moreover, the automated reactiveness of the
framework will be enhanced with the integration of SDN
security patterns [21] on the ODL controller via the devel-
opment of an associated model and the introduction of an
adaptive access control mechanism that will enable the policy-
based management of multiple controllers, across domains
[22]. Finally, the performance of the whole framework will
be evaluated in detail, in a number of application scenarios, to
assess the impact of the proposed mechanisms in the context
of the industrial domain and its intricacies in terms of QoS
requirements.
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